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Kant and Thought Insertion 
 
 
Sacha Golob (King’s College London) 
  
 
 
Abstract: 
This article examines the phenomenon of thought insertion, one of the most extreme 
disruptions to the standard mechanisms for self-knowledge, in the context of Kant’s 
philosophy of mind. This juxtaposition is of interest for two reasons, aside from Kant’s 
foundational significance for any modern work on the self. First, thought insertion presents a 
challenge to Kant’s approach. For example, the first Critique famously held that “The ‘I 
think’ must be able to accompany all my representations” (Kant, KrV, B132). Yet thought 
insertion raises the problem of representations which are ‘mine’ by many natural criteria, and 
yet which I am unwilling to self-ascribe. Ultimately, my argument will be that thought 
insertion simultaneously problematises, and yet to some degree also vindicates, the complex 
distinctions between activity and passivity which underlie Kant’s system. Second, I argue that 
Kant’s position contains resources that allow us to model thought insertion, and its broader 
implications for self-knowledge, in an interesting and distinctive manner. Kant himself held 
an extreme view of philosophy’s competence in the study of mental disorder: in the 
Anthropology, he suggests that courts must refer such cases to philosophers, rather than 
medics (Kant, Anth, p.214). My aim is much more modest: to suggest that a Kantian 
treatment of thought insertion deserves consideration by both philosophers and clinicians.  
 
 
 
§1. Introduction 
 
This article examines the phenomenon of thought insertion, one of the most extreme 
disruptions to the standard mechanisms for self-knowledge, in the context of Kant’s 
philosophy of mind.
1
 This juxtaposition is of interest for two reasons, aside from Kant’s 
foundational significance for any modern work on the self. First, thought insertion presents a 
challenge to Kant’s approach. For example, the first Critique famously held that “The ‘I 
think’ must be able to accompany all my representations” (Kant, KrV, B132).2 Yet thought 
insertion raises the problem of representations which are ‘mine’ by many natural criteria, and 
yet which I am unwilling to self-ascribe. Ultimately, my argument will be that thought 
insertion simultaneously problematises, and yet to some degree also vindicates, the complex 
distinctions between activity and passivity which underlie Kant’s system. Second, I argue that 
Kant’s position contains resources that allow us to model thought insertion, and its broader 
                                                     
1
 Despite Kant’s enormous influence on modern conceptions of the self, there has been relatively little direct 
research applying his views to the thought insertion case. The only existing items of literature of which I am 
aware are Chadwick 1994 and Young 2006. Whilst I am indebted to both authors, the approach defended here 
differs substantially, in part because it draws on the last decade’s research on Kant’s philosophy of mind. I flag 
particular points of divergence from these accounts as they occur. 
2
 As is standard, all references to Kant are to the Akademie edition, Kant 1902-, using the following 
abbreviations: Anth: Anthropologie… (Ak.7); KrV: Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Ak.4); Prol: Prolegomena 
(Ak.4); Log: Logik (Ak.9); Refl.:Reflexion (Ak.16); SvF: Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit…(Ak.2); V-MP/Heinze 
Kant Metaphysik L1 (Heinze) (Ak.28). 
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implications for self-knowledge, in an interesting and distinctive manner. Kant himself held 
an extreme view of philosophy’s competence in the study of mental disorder: in the 
Anthropology, he suggests that courts must refer such cases to philosophers, rather than 
medics (Kant, Anth, p.214). My aim is much more modest: to suggest that a Kantian 
treatment of thought insertion deserves consideration by both philosophers and clinicians.  
 Before proceeding, a few remarks on scope. This article is not intended primarily as 
exercise in textual Kant scholarship. This is partly because pinning down the views of the 
historical Kant would require close exegetical discussion of many connected areas: for 
example, his complex stance on rationalist models of the self, or on the general relationship 
between understanding and intuition. My aim is rather to show how a broadly Kantian 
approach can accessibly and helpfully contribute to the existing discussion of this complex 
medical phenomenon. In line with this, I will try to keep Kantian technical terms to a 
minimum. I am also not going to attempt to do justice to the full range of the existing 
philosophy of mind literature: for example, I will not discuss recent work on thought 
insertion and inner speech.
3
 The underlying assumptions in play there – with respect to the 
nature of such speech, its frequency and its links to ideas such as Evansian transparency – are 
too different from Kant’s own for a fruitful discussion to be possible in the current context. 
Finally, I will treat the “thoughts” which are inserted as beliefs (I say much more on what this 
amounts to below). There are interesting case of what are prima facie ‘emotion insertions’ in 
patient reports, but, given the emphasis on reason-responsivity which characterises the 
Kantian approach, these present a very different set of challenges. I briefly indicate why in 
the conclusion, but a full treatment is beyond the present article.
4
 
 
§2. Definitions and the Basic Kantian Apparatus 
This section will introduce and define the basic concepts I will use. Kant was an enormously 
systematic thinker, and the ideas I isolate are, within his own work, embedded in a perhaps 
uniquely complex larger system. I cannot do justice to this here, and I will, in line with the 
aims set out above, simply bracket it.
5
 
 Thought-insertion is a delusion whereby “the subject believes that thoughts that are 
not his own have been inserted into his mind” (Andreasen 1984, p.3). What is striking is that 
whilst subjects retain introspective access to the relevant thoughts, they are insistent that they 
are not theirs: the experience is of thoughts “which are not [their] own intruding” into their 
consciousness (Wing, Cooper et al. 1974, p.160). Thought insertion so defined should be 
distinguished from two potentially accompanying phenomena. First, patients typically offer 
an explanation as to how this has come about; for example, due to electrical transmission 
(Jaspers 1963, p.580). Such explanations, whilst manifestly problematic, do not carry the 
hallmark feature of alienation: the patient regards the beliefs that articulate the explanation as 
their own, and so I will not discuss this aspect of the situation here. Second, the core 
phenomenon of thought insertion may be supplemented by a further belief as to whom the 
relevant thoughts actually belong. For example, this is a widely cited case from Mellor: 
                                                     
3
 For a helpful survey see Roessler 2013. 
4
 For simplicity’s sake, I follow the standard reading of Kant and treat the perceptual states of adult human 
agents as having the same kind of representational content, namely intuitive judgments, as found in fully 
meaningful beliefs more generally; in other words, I am leaving aside here both the longstanding issue of 
judgments lacking intuitive content, and the more recently pressed one of relationalist readings of Kant on 
perception (see, for example, Gomes 2014). 
5
 Perhaps the main omission will be a detailed discussion of the Paralogisms – this is, unfortunately, simply not 
possible without introducing material regarding Kant’s idealism, his relationship to rationalism, and the complex 
epistemic status of Kantian regulative (as opposed to constitutive) claims about the self, material that would take 
us too far from the main focus of the article. 
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I look out of the window and I think the garden looks nice and the grass looks cool, 
but the thoughts of Eamonn Andrews come into my mind. There are no other thoughts 
there, only his…He treats my mind like a screen and flashes his thoughts onto it like 
you flash a picture. (Mellor 1970, p.17) 
One might thus contrast a ‘negative element’ (i.e. the fact that the patients don’t recognize 
certain thoughts as belonging to them) with this further ‘positive element’ (i.e. the fact that 
they ascribe those thoughts to others) (Hoerl 2001, p.190). But this further element is not 
necessarily present (for example, Jaspers 1963:580), and I will not focus on it here – although 
I suggest in §4 that my approach can make sense of it. 
 The basic characterisation of thought insertion that I have given is a simple one, and it 
is natural to make it more precise by introducing notions such as ownership. But these terms, 
and their inter-relations, are highly contested: there are approaches that present the subject as 
retaining ownership whilst lacking some further factor (Gerrans 2001), and approaches which 
would deny even that (Bortolotti and Broome 2009). So rather that importing such 
terminology at this point, I want first to introduce the Kantian apparatus I will use to frame 
my own account.   
 The place to begin is his conception of self-knowledge. There are, of course, many 
senses in which I might have knowledge about myself. But the one on which philosophers 
have focussed and the one relevant here is knowledge of our own mental states, a knowledge 
that is often thought to have distinctive characteristics of immediacy and authority. Kant 
draws a foundational distinction between two forms of such knowledge, a distinction which 
he articulates in terms of an active/passive contrast. On the one hand, there is what he calls 
“inner sense” – this is “a mere faculty of perception”, an awareness of “what happens to us”, 
such as feeling pain from an injury (Kant, Anth, p.153,161). On the other hand, there is pure 
or transcendental apperception: whereas inner sense is consciousness of what affects us, 
apperception is consciousness of “what the human being does…this belongs to the faculty of 
thinking” (Kant, Anth, p.161).6 Kant’s shorthand for this active or “spontaneous” capacity for 
thought is the ‘I think’ (Kant, KrV, A107, B132). 
 The idea that thought insertion can be usefully analysed in terms of some kind of 
active/passive framework is familiar from many standard accounts: the inserted thoughts 
would be something “done to” the patient, rather than things “done by” her (Fulford 1989, 
220). But what makes Kant distinctive is the way he understands the relevant notion of 
activity, and it is this I want now to discuss. I will approach the issue via the characteristically 
Kantian theme of self-determination. 
 There are many senses in which we might be said to determine ourselves. Not all of 
these are on the same footing. Suppose John takes steroids to speed up his muscle growth. 
The reflexive structure of this act is purely incidental – he could equally have used the same 
drugs to speed up someone else’s development. Moran puts the underlying point nicely: 
In various cases a person may produce in himself various desires, beliefs, or 
emotional responses, either by training, mental discipline, drugs, the cooperation of 
friends, or simply by hurling himself into a situation that will force a certain response 
from him….[T]he resulting attitude is still one I am essentially passive with respect 
to. It is inflicted on me, even if I am the one inflicting it. (Moran 2001, p.117) 
                                                     
6
 In addition to pure or transcendental apperception, Kant also talks occasionally of “empirical apperception”; 
this is equivalent to inner sense (Kant, KrV, A107). In what follows “apperception” will always mean pure or 
transcendental apperception. 
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Suppose alternately that I am faced with some factual question; I consider the evidence, 
deliberate, and thereby acquire the belief that P.
7
 This ability, an ability to exercise a rational 
authority over one’s own beliefs, seems very different from the steroid case: 
 [T]here is surely an intuitive contrast between my power to govern whether I have a 
stomach ache and my power to govern whether I believe P: whereas in the former 
case my control over the relevant condition is at best indirect, in the latter, one wants 
to say, my control may be direct. It is this intuition — that settling on an answer to a 
question can itself be an exercise of some sort of capacity for self-determination — 
that is expressed in the traditional idea that rational creatures have a capacity for free 
“judgment”, a capacity to “make up their minds”. (Boyle 2011, p.17) 
The basic idea is thus that rational agents are able to exercise a particular form of self-
regulation: I determine what my belief is by establishing what is to be believed, given the 
facts before me. As Moran has argued, this distinctive form of self-determination can be used 
to underwrite a distinctively active story about self-knowledge, one on which I have special 
authority to know what I believe, precisely because it is I who determine what it is I believe – 
not in the voluntaristic sense that I can pick my views at random, but in the sense that it is my 
mind to make up. As he puts it: 
If it is possible for a person to answer a deliberative question about his belief at 
all, this involves assuming an authority over, and a responsibility for, what his 
belief actually is. Thus a person able to exercise this capacity is in a position to 
declare what his belief is by reflection on the reasons in favor of that belief, rather 
than by examination of the psychological evidence. In this way…avowal can 
be seen as an expression of genuine self-knowledge (Moran 2004, p.425). 
This has the attractive feature of meshing neatly with what is often called the transparency 
principle, the fact that when asked whether I believe that P, I typically attend to the external 
world, rather than ‘looking inward’: in Evans’s famous formulation, when asked whether I 
believe that there will be a third world war, I consider the geopolitical situation rather than 
engaging in some kind of introspection (Evans 1982, p.225). On Moran’s approach this 
makes immediate sense: I can answer questions about at least reason-responsive mental 
states, such as beliefs, by looking at the world because my verdicts on the latter constitute the 
former. 
 Moran’s influential work has faced multiple challenges in the literature – for example, 
I might sincerely judge that P and yet still not form the belief that P when belief is 
understood to include some rich set of dispositions (consider the phenomenon of implicit 
bias).
8
 But in the present context, my interest is not in a general assessment of Moran (for my 
views on this see Golob: 2016), but rather in two specific points. On the one hand, Moran’s 
approach serves as a good example of the type of Kantian approach I will sketch: this is 
because it powerfully illustrates the idea that rational agents are able to exercise a specific 
kind of self-regulation. On the other hand, however, as has been widely discussed and as is 
visible even in my quick summary, Moran naturally emphasises cases in which I generate 
beliefs through explicit deliberation. This has problematic consequences. For example, it 
means that the theory is less attractive when the relevant question is not ‘do you believe that 
P?’ but rather ‘do you already believe that P?’ – since the latter is naturally read not as asking 
me to now form a view on the facts, but rather to report some antecedently existing state of 
affairs (Shah and Velleman 2005). This type of concern meshes closely with broader post-
                                                     
7
 Moran’s account should equally apply to desires insofar as these are reason responsive – faced with the 
question of whether I ought to take a job in another country, I reflect on the evidence, deliberate and end by 
wanting to do so. But the issue of desires is complex in a Kantian context due to the distinction between maxims 
and incentives – I discuss this below. 
8
 For an illuminating and sophisticated treatment of the worry see McGeer 2007, p.10. 
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Kantian worries about Kant’s talk of apperception or self-consciousness: how is this to be 
understood given that the vast majority of our behaviour does not involve thematic, explicit 
reflection?
9
 So what I want to do is to press the idea of rational self-governance further, but 
shift the focus away from conscious deliberation and towards the distinctive forms of 
behaviour, thematised or unthematised, which rationality makes possible. 
 For Kant one of the key features of rational agents such as humans, in contrast to non-
rational animals (henceforth “animals”), is an ability to “recognise” the “marks” or properties 
of the things they encounter (Kant, SvF p.59). On his view, whilst animals will obviously 
respond differently depending on the properties of the world around them (a dogs recoils 
from a heated piece of metal, but not a cool one), only rational agents are able to represent the 
fact that certain properties imply certain others. This recognitional capacity is what defines 
concept use for Kant, and he therefore cashes concepts in terms of “rules”: for example, to 
possess the concept of <body> is to represent the fact that its application in turn “necessitates 
the representation of extension” (Kant, KrV A106, A126).10 To adapt Kant’s own example, 
an ox may respond very differently to a stall made of paper and one made of steel; but only a 
rational being is able to represent the fact that its being paper implies, given the relevant 
background conditions, other properties (flammability, for example). It is in this sense that 
the Logic treats marks as both “in the thing” and as a “partial representation…considered as 
the ground of cognition” (Log.:58): the recognition of such properties regulates our 
representations. 
 Why does this matter? The answer is that for Kant this capacity transforms the way in 
which rational beings engage with themselves, with each other and with the world. Let me 
give two examples. At an individual level, such recognition brings my representations within 
the domain of a specific kind of assessment. On Kant’s picture, the ox simply sees one thing 
after another – it lack spontaneity in Kantian terms (I discuss association shortly). Rational 
beings, in contrast, are continually taking on commitments: to see the door as wooden means 
that I must be willing to affirm various other properties of it or to retract the initial attribution. 
Mark recognition thus imposes a normative order on experience (Kant, KrV, A104). In 
contemporary jargon, human experience is conceptual or within the space of reasons. But this 
capacity is also crucial from an inter-subjective angle. Suppose the ox’s past leads it associate 
the stall with distress. It is only insofar as I can represent the fact that one property grounds 
another, that I can represent the distinction between such property implications and the type 
of associationistic link manifest in the ox. And it is only insofar as I can draw that distinction 
that I can be aware of the difference between links that are merely an artefact of my own 
psychological history (like the ox’s fear), and those which, since putatively grounded in the 
entity itself, should also hold for other agents. In other words, the capacity to use rules to 
represent objectivity – the entity as a locus of properties with their own implications relations 
(Kant, KrV, A197/B242) – allows me in turn to represent inter-subjectivity, to represent 
something as a fact that should hold for a consciousness “in general, not only my own” (Kant, 
Refl.16, p.633).
11
  
 Much of Kant’s theoretical philosophy is devoted to unpacking the conditions and the 
consequences of these ideas and of the capacity for “apperception” which makes them 
possible. But for current purposes only one more point is needed: these abilities will not 
                                                     
9
 See, for example, Crowell 2007. 
10
 Such inter-property implications may be analytic or synthetic. 
11
 I might be wrong in any particular case – we mistake mere associations for facts all the time. But what is 
significant for Kant is the ability to represent the distinction (similarly, the Second Analogy is an attempt to 
show that the ability to draw a distinction between a succession of perceptions and a perception of succession 
depends on a capacity to deploy the categories; this is perfectly compatible with the fact that we may be wrong 
about which is which in a given case). 
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typically involve thematic or explicit reflection. To adapt a famous post-Kantian example, 
when you ask me to pass you a heavier hammer, I unthinkingly reach for the smaller metal 
one, avoiding the large wooden one: my system automatically represents both the 
connections between the various materials and weight, and the assumption that those 
connections, since grounded in those entity, will also hold for you. These facts provide the 
cognitive infrastructure for practices of explicit justification: if asked why I did what I did, I 
can explain it, but such justification will typically not in fact take place. 
 Bringing these points together, we now have a handle on the distinctive capacity for 
self-determination possessed by Kantian rational agents; it is a capacity to represent, and thus 
to act on, certain relations and certain distinctions. Since this capacity will be widely manifest 
in behaviour, there is no need to rely on cases of explicit deliberation when cashing self-
determination, something Moran and other prominent Kantians are frequently accused of. 
The task now is to demonstrate how this material can be used to flesh out the idea of an 
active/passive distinction. Once that is in place I will then show, in §4, how the combined 
results can be fruitfully applied to thought insertion. 
 
§3. Activity as Commitment 
As I noted above, a standard strategy is to argue that inserted thoughts lack some sense of 
activity, be this “agency” (Stephens and Graham 1994) or “authorship” (Gerrans 2001). But it 
is obviously important to be sure we are operating with the right concepts of activity and 
passivity here. On the passive side, for example, it is widely recognised that we need to 
distinguish thought insertion from cases of obsessive thoughts – the phobic’s incessant fear 
that the plane will crash – which lack the distinctive phenomenology of intrusion. But what 
about the relevant notion of activity? After all, it is vital to keep inserted thoughts separate 
from unbidden or spontaneous thoughts which simply pop in to my mind; in a great many 
unpathological cases, a “thought comes when ‘it’ wants, and not when ‘I’ want” (Nietzsche 
2002, §17). As Mullins and Spence note, such ‘unbidden thoughts’ create a problem for 
authors, such as Stephens and Graham, who identify an “experience of mentally acting” as 
the key feature missing from the insertion case (Spence and Mullins 2003, p.296; the cited 
remark is from Stephens and Graham 1994, p.2). This is why I diverge from Kantian 
accounts such as Young’s which treats active thoughts as those I “generate…and, 
importantly, I am aware of generating them” (Young 2006, p.828). I think Young is right that 
this approach has Kantian backing (for example, Kant, KrV, B158-9), but I think, for the 
reason just given, it is not the best aspect of Kant’s work to utilise here.12 
 As Bortolotti and Broome observe a similar problem will also arise for accounts 
which, whilst incorporating notions like reason-responsiveness, still frame the issue in terms 
of belief formation. They give the example of two attempts to identify a broadly rationalist 
notion of activity, “authorship” which inserted thoughts might lack: 
(a) In order to be the author of the belief that he should file for divorce, Patrick needs 
to have formed that belief on the basis of the best evidence available to him. 
(b) In order to be the author of the belief that he should file for divorce, Patrick needs 
to be able to endorse that belief on the basis of the best evidence available to him. 
(Bortolotti and Broome 2009, p.212) 
The problem with (a) is that outside of explicit reflection, few beliefs are so acquired – in 
addition to the unbidden thoughts just discussed, we often form beliefs and only later come to 
                                                     
12
 Generally, it seems that the cases of automatic or fluid action emphasised by post-Kantian phenomenology 
should make us wonder how often an experience of “generating” thoughts is ever really present. For a classic 
formulation of the phenomenological critique, see Dreyfus 1991. One other point of difference between Young 
and I is that he assigns a central role to Kant’s complex theory of the imagination; I touch on this at the end, but 
my position in no way relies on it. 
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find good reasons for them. So even if inserted thoughts do lack (a), this cannot be what 
makes them distinctive (Bortolotti and Broome 2009, pp.212-3).  
 What about Bortolotti and Broome’s option (b)? They cash “endorsement” in terms of 
“the capacity for reason giving in deliberation or justification, or, depending of the type of 
thought, on behavioural manifestability”. More specifically, it: 
[C]ulminates with the subject taking responsibility over the reported attitude and 
making a commitment to it that is likely to be reflected in further reported attitudes 
and other forms of behaviour. (Bortolotti and Broome 2009, p.213) 
It seems to me that the account at the end of §2 shows how a version of this might work; 
since I am now going to start importing some specifically Kantian claims, I will call this 
version “commitment” to distinguish it from Bortolotti and Broome’s broader notion of 
“endorsement”.13 For rational agents, as Kant sees it, to believe is to take on certain 
commitments, to recognise their implications for your other beliefs, and for the resulting web 
of norms that governs your behaviour. To use Kant’s own example, to see something as a 
body is to bind oneself to the application of various other properties to it, and to the inter-
relation of those properties putatively holding for other agents. For a belief to be mine in this 
sense implies a capacity to undertake a process of explicit justification – as Kant puts it, it 
must be possible for the ‘I think’ to accompany all my thoughts (Kant, KrV, B131) – but this 
possibility need not be realised. Rather, a belief is mine insofar as it enters in to the relevant 
forms of rational combination, combinations which, in line with the results of §2, will be 
behaviourably manifest.  
“I”, in this context, expresses the fact that the representations under consideration are 
bound and reflected from one standpoint, that of the thinker that refers these 
representations to herself and commits herself to the unity and consistency of the 
conceptual ordering of these representations. (Longuenesse 2007, p.153) 
This model of activity fits well with Kant’s agnosticism (at least in the theoretical domain) as 
to the true nature of the self: in the absence of knowledge of the noumenal, it is this “relation 
of rational dependence across mental states that constitutes [our] existence as thinkers” 
(Kitcher 2011, p.252).  
 
§4. Kant on Thought Insertion 
It is now time to directly apply these materials to the question of thought insertion. The basic 
Kantian story will include three elements, elements whose positioning differs significantly 
from much of the literature. First, there is the notion of activity qua commitment as defined in 
§3. Second, there is the notion of ownership: this is to be understood in terms of a willingness 
to self-ascribe the relevant states. Self-ascription is in turn is understood as Longuenesse 
suggested: “the thinker that refers these representations to herself and commits herself to 
[their] unity and consistency” (Longuenesse 2007, p.153). Third, there is some much weaker 
notion which picks out those representations that are ‘mine’ in the looser, non-Kantian sense 
– for example, those available to introspection. In Kantian terms, these are accessible via 
inner sense: a non-rational animal will have representations of its own in this sense, whilst 
lacking any that are owned in the stronger senses tied to apperception (Kant, Anth, p.127). 
                                                     
13
 In virtue of its explicitly Kantian heritage, the account I am outlining differs from Bortolotti and Broome on 
several points. For example, I am – in virtue of the facts about Kantian semantics noted in footnote 4 – more 
willing to apply it to perceptual beliefs than they are (Bortolotti and Broome 2009, p.210). I am also unclear 
how strongly they intend the requirement regarding reason giving: what, for example, of beliefs which the 
subject has inherited unquestioned? (Bortolotti and Broome 2009, pp.212-3). On my account such beliefs 
remain on the active side; what matters is the commitments an agent takes on, even if she can offer no more 
illuminating justification than “that is just how things are”. I return to another point of difference from Bortolotti 
and Broome below; despite these differences, I am indebted to their work. 
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Defining this third group will be difficult, particularly given the point, made by Kant long 
before Nietzsche, Freud and others, that the vast majority of what is mine in this extended 
sense is in fact barely accessible to consciousness (Kant, Anth, p.136).
14
 What makes Kant’s 
story distinctive, however, is not just the elements in play but their connections. One standard 
way to handle thought insertion is to frame the discussion in terms of a coming apart of 
ownership and some relevant notion of activity: inserted thoughts would have the former, but 
not the latter (for example, Gerrans 2001). But a Kantian approach will reject this precisely 
because Kant cashes ownership in terms of commitment: as I noted at the end of the previous 
section, a thought is mine insofar as it is integrated within the normative web of 
commitments. As Moran puts it, in this sense “someone determines what shall be part of him 
as a person” (Moran 2002, p.214).  
 One might have several immediate worries about this proposed taxonomy. On the one 
hand, it can seem a merely verbal shift – why does it matter if we use “ownership” in a way 
that is tied to commitment as opposed to mere introspection? Bortolotti and Broome, who 
propose a similar switch, although on different grounds, provide part of the answer: it does 
better justice to the phenomenology of inserted thoughts, which are precisely introspected 
states that the agent nevertheless refuses to accept as her own (Bortolotti and Broome 2009, 
p.216). But for Kant himself there are also deeper reasons, and these bring me to the other 
natural objection: far from being merely terminological, doesn’t my proposal have the absurd 
implication that huge numbers of non-pathological states are not really mine? For example, 
sensations which do not enter into the type of commitment or justification relations sketched: 
it makes no sense, at both a trivial and a deep level, to say ‘I think hot’, and yet surely I can 
have a feeling of heat? Or what about deep, recurring desires that I see as central to myself 
(‘how typical of me to want that!’) but nevertheless regard as irrational?15 It is important to 
see that for Kant this is not a problem, but precisely the result he wants: we need to take very 
seriously the fact that the ‘I’ for Kant is the ‘I think’.16 This is not the place to enter in to the 
details of Kantian ethics, but the basic point is that ownership for him is necessary and 
sufficient for moral responsibility (Kant, GMS, p.457). In contrast, sensations and desires 
(incentives in proper Kantian terminology) are seen as functions of causal chains, stretching 
back before my birth and over which I have no control, and by extension no direct 
responsibility (Kant, KrV, A445/ B473, A448/B476).
17
 The fact that someone might 
experience certain sexual desires, for example, is thus conceived as an external force acting 
on them, as something merely factual. Ownership and responsibility enter the picture only 
when I take that desire as giving me a reason to act and thus embed it within the web of 
normative commitments. The result is a sharp divide for Kant between activity, commitment 
and ownership and freedom on one side, and a vast multitude of representations which are 
                                                     
14
 In opposition to my approach, Young aligns this loose grouping with the ‘I think’ (Young 2006, p.830). There 
are many ways one might regiment the terminology, but it seems to me Young’s tactic of aligning apperception 
with what he calls “global” representation will create problems with regards to animals, since Kant is insistent 
these lack the ‘I think’ (Kant, Anth, p.127). At a primary text level, the issue is visible in Kant’s vacillations 
over whether to allow animals “consciousness” [Bewustβein] (for a close study of the relevant passage see 
McLear, 2011). 
15
 In Kantian technical terms, incentives or Triebfedern that are not taken up into maxims. I am supressing 
complications here concerning the precise way in which incentives might be incorporated into maxims and 
potentially harmonised with our other commitments and with obligations such as those set out by the categorical 
imperative; their recognition would not affect the basic point of the paragraph, but would require extensive 
treatment of issues surrounding the so called ‘Incorporation Principle’ (the locus classicus here is Allison 1990). 
16
 Or the ‘I do’, i.e. ‘the I endorse this maxim’ – see the citation at the end of the paragraph. 
17
 I say “likely” as I cannot deal here with the complex issue of our responsibility not to enter situations in 
which, the relevant causal chains being what they are, my incentives will tend further in directions that I ought 
not to endorse (Kant, GMS, p.399). 
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caused to occur ‘in me’, i.e. at the point where my body is situated, without thereby being 
‘mine’, without being something I own. With respect to these: 
I could not say: “I do it” but must rather say: “I feel in myself an impulse to do it 
which something has incited in me”. (Kant, V-MP/Heinze, p.269) 
There is clearly a huge amount that is controversial in the views just sketched. But the task 
now is to apply them to thought insertion. To the lay the groundwork for this, I will take the 
cases of non-pathological unbidden thoughts, and then obsessive thoughts, before dealing 
with insertion itself. 
 First off, unbidden thoughts which are reason-responsive: for example, my sudden 
realisation that I have left the window open. These are unproblematic for Kant for the reasons 
discussed in §2. They are fully fledged beliefs, through which I thereby take on various 
commitments (to the conditional that if it rains the floor will be soaked, to the act of shutting 
it given my other beliefs and desires). The fact that that they arose unbidden is unproblematic 
since blanket talk of agency has been replaced by notions of commitment and ownership 
defined in terms of normative integration. 
 Second, obsessive thoughts which lack the distinctive pathology of inserted thoughts. 
This is obviously a huge class ranging from those linked to compulsive disorders (‘I must 
wash my hands again’) to images which continually intrude in the mind to an endless posing 
and re-posing of what most agents would see as settled questions (‘do my friends like me’ ‘is 
the gas on’ etc.). Such obsessive thoughts present an interesting case for Kant because they 
are often not responsive to reasoning: “I can find myself thinking or worrying that P even 
though I realize that there is no reason to think or worry that P” (Cassam, 2011, p.6). My 
suggestion is that the Kantian pursue a divide and conquer strategy with respect to the class 
as a whole. On the one hand, there are cases of systemic bias in reasoning – agents who 
habitually endorse conclusions that the rest of us regard as unsustainable. This might stem 
from a particular attitude to the risk calculus, as in the case of agents who systematically 
over-react to extremely small risks (one can imagine a compulsive handwasher driven by 
this). Such misguided judgments are, from a Kantian perspective, owned by the agent; she 
has mistaken views, but they are hers. On the other hand, there are states that are not best 
seen as actually taking on a commitment (not seen as making a judgment in the technical 
Kantian sense – Kant, Prol, p.305). Rather they are what O’Brien nicely calls “mere 
apprehensions of content” (O'Brien 2013, p.95). On this model, an image or a thought might 
insistently intrude into my mind in the way a song or a pain can: standing at the top of the 
stairs with the baby, an image of it lifeless on the floor flashes before my eyes. For Kant such 
cases are genuinely passive, genuinely unresponsive to reason and not owned: I cannot say “I 
think” of them, “I could not say: ‘I do it’” but only that external factors are generating a 
certain state within my body. (Kant, V-MP/Heinze, p.269). Whilst she would doubtless not 
endorse Kant’s own use of this type of tactic, O’Brien’s own agency approach thus offers a 
sharp formulation of the basic approach Kant would use for dealing with ‘non-inserted’ but 
obsessive thoughts: 
In response to the claim that there are ‘passive judgements’ that are unresponsive to 
reason the agency theorist can, therefore, insist that either the recalcitrance is 
consistent with us taking them to be active commitments by the subject to how the 
world is on some basis, and are thus tractable from the point of view of the agency 
theory approach to judgement, or are such that it is inconsistent with them being 
commitments at all. We get the impression that there could be a genuine commitment 
to the world being thus and so only by thinking it, only by switching between cases 
which are mere entertainings and cases which are judgements based on unstable 
reasons. (O'Brien 2013, p.98) 
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Adding the clarification that such “mere entertainings”, whilst well labelled in contrast to 
judgments, may be radically disruptive and troubling to the subject (for example, consider 
intrusive images of violence), this is the divide and conquer approach I advocated. 
 We are now in a position to tackle inserted thoughts directly. I propose the following 
Kantian analysis. Inserted thoughts are representations that have the semantic and cognitive 
form of commitments, of “judgments” or “maxims” in Kant’s technical vocabulary – and yet 
which are radically at odds with the subject’s existing commitments. The key difference from 
obsessive thoughts is that obsessive thoughts are either embedded within the agent’s 
normative framework (the first horn of the strategy just sketched), or are “such that it is 
inconsistent with them being commitments at all” (O'Brien 2000, p.98).  
One easy way to approach the proposal is by looking at cases where the inserted 
thought takes the form of a command: 
Thoughts are put into my mind like ‘Kill God’. It’s just like my mind working, but it 
isn’t. They come from this chap, Chris. They’re his thoughts. (Frith 1992, p. 66)  
What is happening here is that a representation has entered the system which has normative 
force – it purports to oblige the subject to do something. In Kantian terms, it is on the active 
side of the line; it is a judgment or commitment that something ought to be done. The 
problem is that the individual does not recognise the state’s commitments and thus does not 
see himself as its owner. This is due to its discontinuity with what Longuenesse aptly called 
“the unity and consistency of the conceptual ordering” of his existing “standpoint”. In this 
sense, the inserted thought is on the passive side of the line: it is not part of the network of 
self-legislated rules and obligations that define the Kantian I. The result is twofold. First, the 
subject disavows ownership due to this perceived clash: she cannot say “I think”. Second, this 
disavowal generates the distinctive phenomenology well-captured by Jaspers: 
The patient does not know why he has this thought nor did he not know why he has 
this thought nor did he intend to have it. He does not feel master of his own thoughts 
and in addition he feels in the power of some incomprehensible external force. 
(Jaspers 1963, pp.122-3) 
This is exactly what Kant would predict: the phenomenology is of being bound by a rule that 
you did not make yourself.  
 What about cases that lack a straightforward command form? Consider a subject who 
reports experiencing misogynistic inserted thoughts, a constantly intrusive insistence that 
“women are y” where “y” is some string of sexual slurs. From a Kantian perspective, in line 
with §2, such claims still contain, albeit less obviously, the same command and obligation 
structure. To judge that x is y, as opposed to merely associating the two such that the presence 
of one triggers the presence of the other before the mind, is to represent the former property 
as grounding the latter, to oblige oneself to attribute the latter to anything that has the former, 
and to represent the fact that since this attribution is so grounded it should hold for all similar 
agents and not just for me. Thus to have this judgment in the system is to take on a whole 
web of commitments as sketched in §2. What patients are reacting to in thought insertion is 
the fact that something of this form has suddenly been added to their system, a line of 
normative coding, which they cannot reconcile with what else was already there.  
 It is important to stress how this differs from mere inconsistency. Doubtless we all 
have multiple conflicts between our various commitments. But these are typically not 
manifest to us, and when they become so we either try to repair them, or simply ignore the 
clash until our attention shifts elsewhere. But in the thought assertion case, a radical clash is 
presented with an insistent degree of phenomenological saliency: the inserted thoughts don’t 
simply fade in to the background in the way the conflicts between someone’s highly paid job 
and their professed politics might as other things dominate their attention. The result is 
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effectively a persistent avowal of both P and not P; unsurprisingly, individuals faced with 
this come to disown one of the thoughts. 
 The irony of the Kantian framework is this. My strongest desire is, as discussed 
above, in an important sense not mine; it is something that happens ‘in me’. This is, very 
crudely, because it is a product of causal forces, ultimately stretching back beyond my 
control. The ‘I’, in contrast, is defined in normative terms, in terms of the ability to subject 
my representations and so my behaviour to rules (Kant, KrV, A104-5). Inserted thoughts 
have this normative structure, and yet precisely because of it are disowned by agents. I have 
focussed on what §2 called the ‘negative’ aspect of thought insertion, the denial of 
ownership, rather than on the ‘positive’ aspect, the belief that the thoughts belong to some 
(possibly quite specific) other person. But one can see how the approach sketched might 
naturally handle that. From a Kantian perspective, a commitment, a judgment, is an act of 
some agent, an act of binding themselves in various ways.
18
 If I am introspectively aware of 
such a representation and yet am sure that I have not made the relevant commitments, it 
becomes natural to assume that someone else has done so. 
 Suppose an agent is faced with this state – what might he or she do? Clearly, one 
option is to try to remove the inserted thought from the system or at least lessen its 
prominence; for example, through some form of drug treatment. But from a Kantian 
perspective, there is another, interesting alternative: try to restore “the unity and consistency 
of the conceptual ordering” (Longuenesse 2007, p.153). If the divide between the rogue code 
and their existing perspective is too great, that may be impossible and some form of 
breakdown will result. But what is striking is that at least in some case reflective patients 
report trying exactly what the Kantian approach would predict: removing the feeling of 
alienation by integrating the problematic thoughts so that they become ‘mine’ and not just ‘in 
me’. This is an exchange between an interviewer, Ira Glass, and Patricia Deegan, a 
psychologist who suffers from auditory hallucinations: 
IG: How do you conceive of the voices that you hear? As separate from your self, or 
do you conceive of them as part of your self that you can recognize?  
PD: I think that for me it’s a goal to eventually say these voices are a part of me, and 
that’s actually one of the self-help coping strategies that I do use sometimes...So, for 
instance, if I have a particularly derogatory or awful voice, that I might say, as a 
coping strategy, ‘today I am feeling like I am no good, today I am feeling like I’m a 
worthless person, these are my thoughts, these are my feelings. (Jenkins and Barrett 
2004, p.37) 
 
§5. Conclusion 
One of the classic questions Kantian philosophies face is the sustainability of the different 
dualisms on which they are built. Thus post-Kantian thought often focussed precisely on 
those elements – such as socially cultivated desires (Hegel) and the transcendental 
imagination (Hegel and Heidegger) – which might problematise the boundary between active 
and passive, between spontaneity and sensibility. The case of thought insertion raises similar 
issues. In a more modern idiom, the position I have outlined is one on which inserted 
thoughts are unusual precisely because they are both within and without the space of reasons. 
Obsessive thoughts, in contrast, are easier to regiment as either in or out. Leaving aside these 
kind of broader issues, it further seems that Kant’s account has some interesting implications 
                                                     
18
 I am suppressing various complexities regarding the relation between spontaneity, which I take to be 
exercised in taking on conceptual commitments in this fashion, and full blown Kantian autonomy which 
involves self-legislation in an even stronger sense (crudely, I not only give myself some law like ‘treat all x as y’ 
I, or rather my rational nature, is the full source of the law’s content). Treatment of this issue would require a 
discussion of the theoretical/practical distinction in Kant which is beyond the scope of this article. 
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at the micro-level. One is the link just noted to particular treatment strategies. Another 
concerns the relationship between self-ascription and activity. For example, Bortolotti and 
Broome identify thought insertion as a failure of both self-ascription and authorship 
(Bortolotti and Broome 2009, p.219). But, given their definitions, self-ascription without 
authorship is extremely common (Bortolotti and Broome 2009, p.212): if this is the case, why 
is the latter’s absence sometimes bound up with the radical refusal to self-ascribe seen in 
thought insertion? On the Kantian picture, what makes inserted thoughts distinctive is not a 
straightforward failure of commitment, something that is extremely widespread for Kant, but 
the distinctive hybrid state I have discussed.  
 One way to develop these results would be to use the ‘inserted emotion’ case to drive 
the wedge in from another angle, so to speak. Consider this report from Mellor: 
I cry, tears roll down my cheeks and I look unhappy, but I have a cold anger because 
they’re using me in this way, and it’s not me who’s unhappy, but they’re projecting 
unhappiness onto my brain. They project upon me laughter, for no reason, and you 
have no idea how terrible it is to laugh and look happy and know it’s not you, but 
their emotions. (Mellor, 1970, p. 17) 
The challenge for Kant here is to explain, in effect, how one emotion can be any more 
heteronomous than another; but that is a task for another paper.
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